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Naturalization as a Constitutionally Protected Institution:
Revisiting Article 22.2 of the Japanese Constitution
Luis PEDRIZA＊
Abstract
Naturalization, as the legal process whereby a non-national living in a
country may acquire citizenship of that country, has never attracted particular
attention by most scholars of constitutional law in Japan. However, naturali-
zation has a significant impact in the protection of foreignersʼ fundamental
rights and in the enhancement of the political accountability of democratic
institutions. This research was aimed at providing naturalization with a
constitutional pedigree by approaching it as a constitutionally protected
institution. In doing so, the article analyzes the traditional concept of
ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ and explores adaptability to the field of fundamental
rights of different categories of ʻcapacityʼ as used in the sphere of private law.
Finally, the article revisits the conventional interpretation of Article 22.2 of the
Constitution by challenging the, as of now, uncontroversial assumption that the
right to abandon oneʼs nationality only matters to Japanese nationals. Thus, by
proposing a new construction of Article 22.2 as the right to have access to
Japanese citizenship, the article tries to reconcile the wide discretionary powers
granted to the Diet to determine the conditions to be a Japanese national
(Article 10 of the Constitution) with the constitutional necessity for a
mechanism that allows non-nationals to become fully fledged members of the
polity, as a result of having acquired close ties with it. As an Appendix, this
paper also includes a partial translation of the Japanese Nationality Act, i.e.,
Articles 4-10, which regulate the rules of naturalization under Japanese law.
1- Introduction
As a foreigner who has lived in Japan for more than a decade, one of the
most regrettable features of the Japanese constitution is its lack of any reference
to the status of non-nationals (foreigners and stateless persons), particularly in
regard to the protection of their fundamental rights. The Constitution is totally
＊ Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University. This work was
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silent1). By no means however, does this silence imply that the Japanese
constitution does not guarantee rights and freedoms to foreigners who live in, work
in, or simply visit Japan. On the contrary, most constitutional law scholars and the
Supreme Court itself agree that the Constitution also protects fundamental rights to
non-nationals. To support this opinion, three arguments are generally put forward:2)
1. The fundamental rights protected by the Constitution have a pre-
constitutional nature, and its guarantee therefore precedes the existence of
the State.
2. The constitution itself is based upon the principle of international
cooperation.
3. It has become a widely accepted principle of international law that
countries should not discriminate between nationals and non-nationals
when protecting fundamental rights3).
If the truth be told, some early interpretations of the Japanese constitution
rejected the idea that non-nationals were also entitled to the protection of
fundamental rights. These opinions relied on a literal approach to the language of
the Constitution, which established, in Chapter 3, a catalogue of the “Rights and
1) The ʻframersʼ of the Japanese Constitution did not inadvertently omit any reference to the
status of non-nationals. In the constitutional draft prepared by SCAP­the document which
served as a model for the current constitution­Article XIII determined that “all natural
persons are equal before the law”, and Article XVI, even more clearly, stated that “aliens
shall be entitled to the equal protection of law”. It also bears noting that the document known
as “Reform of the Japanese Governmental System” (SWNCC-228), issued on January 7,
1946 to describe the policies of the US government regarding the overhaul of the Japanese
constitutional system, recommended the inclusion of an “explicit provision in the
Constitution for the guarantee of fundamental civil rights both to Japanese subjects and to all
persons within Japanese jurisdiction”. Regarding why these references to non-nationals were
dropped from the constitutional draft adopted by the Japanese government, see K.
Takayanagi (et al.), The Drafting Process of the Japanese Constitution『日本国憲法の制定
過程』Yuhikaku (1972) pp. 275 and 431 and R. A. Moore and D. L. Robinson, Partners for
Democracy Oxford (2002) pp. 129-130.
2) M. Gotô, “Human Rights of Foreigners”「外国人の人権」in O. Makoto and K. Ishikawa
(eds.), Issues on Constitutional Law『憲法の争点』Yuhikaku (2008) p. 74.
3) Cf. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in Article 2.1, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Article 2.2, determining
that the rights enunciated and recognized by them should be ensured by state parties to all
individuals under their jurisdiction without distinction or discrimination “of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”
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Duties of the People”4).
The first scholarly opinion that also recognized non-nationals as subjects of
fundamental rights looked at the language of the bill of rights to determine the
scope of protection. Popularly known as the ʻwording-approachʼ (文言説), this
interpretation focused on the different language used by different provisions in the
bill of rights, some of which guaranteed particular rights to “every person” (何
人)5), and some of which only protected certain rights to “the people” (国民)6).
Consequently, the argument goes, the former category of provisions is deemed
granted to any person regardless of nationality, whereas the latter only applies to
Japanese nationals7). The rationale behind this opinion is straightforward, and holds
reasonably well in most cases. However, critics contend that the wording-approach
leads to contradictions, such as the fact that Article 22.2, which recognizes the
ʻright to abandon oneʼs nationalityʼ (国籍離脱の自由), is granted to “every
person”, although the actual subjects of this right are only Japanese nationals8).
The vast majority of constitutional scholars currently agree that the ʻnatureʼ or
ʻessenceʼ of the fundamental right in question and the status of individual
foreigners, should be the criteria to determine which rights are protected for non-
nationals and which rights are not9). This opinion, commonly known as the ʻnature-
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4) See, S. Sôichi, Theory of the Japanese Constitution『日本国憲法論』Yuhikaku (1949) p.
467. and K. Kojima, Overview of Constitutional Law『憲法概説』Ryoshofukyukai (1987)
pp. 155-157. These authors assume a negative stance on the issue, but argue that the
protection of some fundamental rights could be expanded to also cover non-nationals as a
matter of legislative policy, and to the extent that it had become a generally accepted custom
among the international community. Y. Hagino, on the other hand, in his Studies on
Fundamental Human Rights『基本的人権の研究』Horitsubunkasha (1980) p. 64, argues
that even though the provisions of fundamental rights are essentially protected only for
nationals, they can be applied mutatis mutandis to non-nationals as well.
5) Articles 16, 17, 18, 20.1, 20.2, 22.1, 22.2, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38.1, 38.2, 39, and 40.
6) Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26.1, 26.2, 27, and 30.
7) T. Irie, A Reader on the Japanese Constitution『日本国憲法読本』Umiguchi-shoten (1948)
pp. 66-67.
8) N. Ashibe, “The Subject of Human Rights”「人権享有の主体」in N. Ashibe (ed.),
Constitutional Law II- Human Rights (1)『憲法 II人権(1)』Yuhikaku (1978) p. 9.
9) The dominant constitutional doctrine identifies the following fundamental rights as not
protected to non-nationals: voting rights,­both in national and local elections­; the right to
enter and to re-enter the country; the right to an abode; social rights (however, in reality,
most social rights are protected to foreigners as a matter of legislative policy), and the right
to have access to public service on general terms of equality. Regarding freedom of
expression on political affairs it is considered protected, but subject to certain restrictions. →
approachʼ (性質説) was also adopted by the Supreme Court in its landmark
decision known as the Mclean Case. The court argued “It should be understood
that the guarantee of fundamental rights included in Chapter Three of the
Constitution extends also to foreign nationals staying in Japan except for those
rights, which by their nature, are understood to address Japanese nationals
only.”10)
Of course, it is one thing to agree that the Constitution guarantees
fundamental rights to non-nationals, and a different thing to conclude that the
constitutional document makes no distinction between citizens and foreigners.
Obviously, the scope of constitutional protection granted to non-nationals is
narrower, in Japan as elsewhere, than that granted to Japanese nationals. As a
result, the only path for a non-national to achieve full protection of fundamental
rights is to become a national, and it is in this respect where naturalization comes
into play.
Thus, naturalization, as a way of acquiring citizenship, plays a decisive role in
protecting the fundamental rights of non-nationals. Nevertheless, as a matter of
course, a thorough investigation of the constitutional foundations of naturalization
has been neglected by most constitutional academics of constitutional law. To be
sure, it is not uncommon to find accurate descriptions of the basic rules of
naturalization in the mainstream constitutional literature11). However, by so doing,
scholars tend to see naturalization as merely being one of different ways of
acquiring Japanese citizenship, and furthermore simply set up by legislative fiat.
And yet, could not naturalization be approached from a genuine perspective of
constitutional law? I will try to explore this idea in this paper, and in doing so, I
will address four interrelated questions whose answers, I believe, may evoke
suggestive insights into the mainstream of Japanese constitutional doctrine:
• Does naturalization exist as a simple legislative choice, or as a
constitutional command?
• Can naturalization be understood as a constitutionally protected
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→ See Y. Watanabe, J. Shishidô, K. Matsumoto, and T. Kudô, Constitutional Law I:
Fundamental Rights『憲法 I基本権』Nihonhyoronsha (2016) pp. 37-40.
10) Ruling of the Supreme Court (Full Bench) of 4 October, 1978 in Minshû vol. 32 no. 7 p.
1223.
11) See K. Satô, Theory of the Japanese Constitution『日本国憲法論』Seibundo (2013) p. 109.
This author also distinguishes between naturalization lato sensu as any way of acquiring
nationality after birth, and naturalization stricto sensu as the legal process regulated in
Articles 4-10 of the Nationality Law (see Appendix).
institution?
• What are the chief functions to be fulfilled by naturalization from a
constitutional point of view?
• Is it appropriate to construe Article 22.2 of the Constitution as a
provision that guarantees non-nationals a right to have access to Japanese
citizenship?
Article 10: Is naturalization a statutory choice or a constitutional
command?
Naturalization can be defined as the legal process whereby a non-national
living in a country may acquire the citizenship of that country. Naturalization is
ubiquitous all over the world as a legal mechanism, although the rules of
naturalization vary greatly from country to country. Naturalization may
occasionally be conferred by statutory decision; sometimes it may involve an
application by the non-national and approval by administrative authorities; most
countries usually establish a minimum legal residency requirement, and may
specify other requirements such as knowledge of the national language, an oath to
obey and uphold that countryʼs laws; and at times, a renunciation of any other
citizenship held by the applicant. At any rate, no matter how strict conditions might
be, virtually no country in the world completely closes the path of nationality to all
foreigners.
That being said, the question arises as to whether naturalization exists ope
constitutionis, viz., as a command of the constitution, or conversely, it has been
established ope legis, viz., by decision of the legislature. Indeed, my interest in the
topic emerges from the simple question, –admittedly, more theoretical than
practical– on whether the National Diet could do away with the naturalization
process altogether, or if, on the contrary, naturalization is so embedded in the
constitutional system that it must somehow be regulated.
Let us address the question by having a look at what the Constitution says on
the matter. The Constitution, in Article 10, determines that “the conditions
necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law”. Thus, the
Constitution vests the legislature with discretionary powers to set out a legal
framework on nationality issues12). The National Diet has addressed the
implementation of Article 10 by enacting the Nationality Law.
12) The Meiji Constitution followed basically the same principle when it determined in Article
18: “The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law”.
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Prima facie, it can be asserted that the Constitution has left ample room for
the legislature to elaborate on a comprehensive nationality scheme. These
discretionary powers though, do not amount to carte blanche on the issue, so the
National Diet is expected to respect certain constitutional principles. A brief
account on the historical development of the Japanese Nationality Law will suffice
to see how the ʻgeneral willʼ, as represented by the National Diet, is ultimately
bound by constitutional­and even international law­constraints13).
In parallel with its constitutional history, Japan has had two different
frameworks that have regulated Japanese nationality. The ʻoldʼ Nationality Law
was enacted on April 1, 1899, and subsequently amended in 1916 and 1924. After
Japanʼs defeat in WWII, the former Nationality Law, with the advent of the new
Constitution, was replaced with a ʻnewʼ one passed on September 1, 1950. The
necessity to adapt its content to a substantially different constitutional system made
it easier for the National Diet to re-enact a new Nationality Law rather than having
to amend the old one. Three features can particularly be highlighted in the old
Nationality Law that rendered it incompatible with the new Constitution.
1. The former law narrowly limited the circumstances under which Japanese
citizenship could be abandoned, and even if possible, authorization by the
Ministry of Justice was always required. Since the new Constitution, in
Article 22.2 granted the right to abandon oneʼs nationality, the current
system establishes that those nationals who obtain a new citizenship will
abandon their Japanese citizenship.
2. The old Nationality Law had many provisions based upon the institution
of ʻhouseholdʼ (家制度), which were at odds with the principles of
individual dignity and equality of sexes as guaranteed by the Constitution
in Article 24. For instance, under the former system the nationality of a
married woman should follow that of her husband, according to the
principle of the family unit. Marriage and divorce under the new law no
longer affect the wifeʼs nationality.
3. The old Nationality Law banned naturalized Japanese nationals from
becoming a minister of the state or any other high status public official.
Following the principle of equality, as established by the new Constitution
13) As a brief account of the historical development of the Nationality Law, see H. Ooyama,
“Multiple Nationality and the Principle of Single Nationality”「重国籍と国籍唯一の原則」
in Rippo to Chosa No. 295 (2009) pp. 108-111. Retrieved at http: //www. sangiin. go.
jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2009pdf/20090801103.pdf
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in Article 14.1, this restriction was not included in the current law.
The Nationality Law underwent important reforms in the 1980s, when Japan
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). The CEDAW, in Article 9.2, determined “States Parties shall
grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their
children.” Since the Nationality Law, in Article 2.1, only granted Japanese
nationality by birthright to children born to a Japanese father, Japanʼs government
was bound to amend the provision so as to also include the mother14). However,
since this amendment was expected to increase the number of Japanese nationals
holding more thanone citizenship, new rules were introduced to avoid multiple
citizenship.
More than two decades later, a new amendment of the Nationality Law was
prompted by a Supreme Court judgment of July 4, 200815). The Court, declared that
Article 3.1 of the Nationality Law ran afoul of the principle of equality before the
law as guaranteed by the Constitution in Article 14.1. Article 3.1 of the Nationality
Law used to make a distinction in the requisites to acquire Japanese nationality
between a) children born out-of-wedlock to a Japanese father and a non-Japanese
mother and acknowledged by the father after birth, (for them to become Japanese
nationals, they had to acquire the status of children born-in-wedlock through
ʻlegitimationʼ, viz., through the marriage of their parents), and b) children born out-
of-wedlock to a Japanese mother and a non-Japanese father, as well as children
born out-of-wedlock to a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother and
acknowledged by the father before birth (for them legitimation was not required to
become a Japanese national). As a result, Article 3.1 was amended on December
15, 2008, and currently any minor acknowledged by a Japanese father is eligible to
acquire Japanese citizenship.
As far as the main topic of this paper is concerned, two sections in the Courtʼs
opinion deserve particular attention.
First, regarding Article 10 of the Constitution, the Court argued: “since
nationality is the qualification for being a member of a particular state, and when
specifying the requirements for acquisition or loss of nationality, it is necessary to
take into consideration various factors concerning each state, including historical
14) The Nationality Law is premised upon the principle of ius sanguinis; ius soli principle has
only been adopted to prevent children from becoming stateless when they are assumed to
have been born on Japanese soil and their parents are unknown or they have no nationality at
all.
15) Ruling of the Supreme Court (Full Bench) of 4 June, 2008 in Minshû vol. 62 no. 6 p. 1367.
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backgrounds, tradition, and political, social and economic circumstances, the
determination of the content of these requirements should be left to the discretion
of the legislative body. However, if any distinction caused by the requirements
under a law concerning acquisition of Japanese nationality that are specified
based on such legislative discretion amounts to discriminatory treatment without
reasonable grounds, such a situation, needless to say, raises a question of violation
of Article 14.1 of the Constitution.”
Thus, it is apparent that the Supreme Court believes that those discretionary
powers vested in National Diet by Article 10 of the Constitution are not unlimited
but bound by the Constitution itself.
Second, when assessing whether the requirement of legitimation to grant
nationality to children acknowledged after birth by a Japanese father was
unconstitutional, the Court first affirmed that the purpose behind Article 3.1 was
not against the Constitution, since here the legislators were simply trying to
determine whether there were ʻclose tiesʼ (密接な結びつき) between certain
individuals and Japan. However, the Court concluded, requiring the Japanese father
to marry the non-Japanese mother in order to grant Japanese citizenship to their
child born out-of-wedlock, was no longer a reasonable means to determine the
exisfence of ʻclose tiesʼ between the child and Japan, “in the light of the changes
in social and economic circumstances in Japanese society, where the realities of
family life and parent-child relationships have become so diverse”.
The idea of ʻclose tiesʼ between states and individuals as a litmus test to
determine who is entitled to become a national is particularly insightful because the
Court seemed to be arguing that the Constitution commands the legislature to grant
Japanese nationality to those who are closely tied with the national community,
even if ultimately the lawmakers have ample leeway in determining the criteria to
verify the ʻclosenessʼ of such ties. To put it another way, the Court arguably
concluded that individuals who had close ties with Japan should be entitled to
Japanese nationality. Hence, if this interpretation is correct, naturalization must be
deemed a built-in element of the constitutional system, since it is the mechanism
by which citizenship is granted to those who have come to have close ties with
Japan. In short, naturalization is to be regulated with a great deal of discretion on
the legislatureʼs side, although its very existence has to be respected by it.
Thus, this conclusion serves as an answer to the question on the heading:
naturalization has been established ope constitutionis. To further explore this idea,
the concept of constitutionally protected institutions, or ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ
will be examined in the next section.
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2- Naturalization as an ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ
The concept of institutionelle garantie was originally developed as a device to
interpret some of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution (1919)16). It was
introduced in Japan and translated as ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ (制度的保障). The
term though, can be misleading because the idea of an ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ in
its original understanding did not imply that there was something that should be
ʻinstitutionallyʼ or ʻsystematicallyʼ guaranteed by the Constitution, but that the
Constitution should protect particular ʻinstitutionsʼ (e.g., churches and universities)
from the action of the legislature17).
An standard account of the Japanese version of the concept can be found in N.
Ashibeʼs Constitutional Law (6th Edition), which is probably the most popular
textbook on Japanese constitutional law18). Ashibeʼs approach to the concept of an
institutional guarantee can be summarized in three basic ideas:
1. The Constitution, along with provisions which are meant to protect
particular fundamental rights, also includes provisions that protect certain
institutions.
2. The legislature cannot legislate in a way that may infringe on the ʻcore
contentʼ of those institutions.
3. For a particular system or institution to be considered as an institutional
guarantee, its core content has first to be clear, and second the relationship
between the institution and a particular fundamental right must be close
and tightly knit.
Ashibe then goes on to give examples of institutional guarantees by referring
to the principle of ʻstate secularismʼ (Articles 20.1, 20.3, and 89)19), the principle of
ʻuniversity autonomyʼ (Article 23)20), the system of ʻprivate propertyʼ (Article 29.
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16) Carl Schmitt can be considered as the first theorist of the concept. According to Schmitt, the
constitution, along with subjective rights, contains provisions to guarantee that certain
institutions cannot be eliminated by lawmakers. There are, therefore, institutional guarantees
with and without subjective rights attached to them. Cf. Carl Schmitt (translated by Jeffrey
Seitzer), Constitutional Theory Duke University (2007) pp. 208-211.
17) Note that the Japanese word seido can be rendered into English either as ʻsystemʼ or as
ʻinstitutionʼ. Although both words are not synonyms –in fact, from an etymological point of
view it could be said that a ʻsystemʼ (from the Greek verb synhistanai, literally ʻto set togetherʼ)
is made up of various ʻinstitutionsʼ (from the Latin verb instituere, literally ʻto set up something
withinʼ); in this article, I will be using both terms indistinctively, unless otherwise warranted.
18) N. Ashibe, Constitutional law (6th Edition)『憲法（第六版）』Iwanami Shoten (2015) p. 86.
19) N. Ashibe, Constitutional law… op.cit. p. 159.
20) N. Ashibe, Constitutional law… op.cit. p. 171.
1)21), and the principle of ʻlocal autonomyʼ or ʻhome-ruleʼ (Article 92)22).
When dealing with certain issues on fundamental rights, on the other hand,
courts have also drawn on the idea of institutional guarantees. The most
representative instance by the Supreme Court is perhaps in its ruling known as the
Ground-breaking Ceremony Case of July 13, 197723). According to the Courtʼs
opinion on the principle of state secularism, “the provisions on religion-state
separation are essentially an institutional guarantee; that is to say, they do not
directly guarantee freedom of religion per se, but attempt to guarantee it indirectly
by securing a system in which religion and the State are separate”. Also, in its
ruling of March 8, 1989, known as the Repeta Case24), on the principle of ʻpublic
trialsʼ as established by the Constitution in Article 82, the Court stated that even
though “the gist of the matter is to guarantee the conducting of hearings open to
the general public in a fair manner as an established system, thus in turn securing
the confidence of the people in regard to the trials”, the constitutional provision
does not include a “right to observe trials, nor does it guarantee the right of
spectators to take notes in the courtroom”.
It can be argued that, as used by the prevailing constitutional doctrine and by
the Supreme Court, the concept of institutional guarantees suffers from some
shortcomings.
First, the concept is not univocal, but presents multifarious content. Thus,
under the umbrella of ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ, we can identify up to three kinds of
constitutional provisions: a) provisions within the bill of rights, such as Article 20
(freedom of religion/state secularism), which recognize a fundamental right and
establish an institutional guarantee in a parallel way, b) provisions such as Article
23 (academic freedom/university autonomy) and Article 29 (right to
property/system of private property), also within the bill of rights, where the
institutional guarantee stems directly from the fundamental right itself, thereby
forming an integrated whole, and c) provisions such as Article 82 (the principle of
public trials) and Article 92 (the principle of local autonomy), outside the bill of
rights, where the idea of ʻinstitutionʼ seems to be resorted to in order to avoid
having to consider these provisions as individual rights.
Second, even though mainstream scholars localize their discussion on
Naturalization as a Constitutionally Protected Institution:
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21) N. Ashibe, Constitutional law… op.cit. p. 234.
22) N. Ashibe, Constitutional law… op.cit. p. 367.
23) Ruling of the Supreme Court (Full Bench) of 13 July, 1977 in Minshû vol. 31 no. 4 pp. 539-
540.
24) Ruling of the Supreme Court (Full Bench) of 8 March, 1989 in Minshû vol. 43 no. 2 p. 92.
institutional guarantees within the arena of fundamental rights, they use as
examples in order to illustrate the concept provisions outside the bill of rights that
are not directly related to any fundamental right in particular.
Finally, the Supreme Court has approached the concept pragmatically,
basically as a means to narrow the scope of standing-to-sue against prospective
constitutional litigation. Thus for instance, when the Court argues that the system
of state secularism is an ʻinstitutional guaranteeʼ and not per se a constitutional
right, in practical terms, it is closing the door against individuals trying to sue the
state should a public authority act in a way that may contravene the principle. As a
matter of fact, the Court has never explained what the content of a particular
institution is, nor has it ever bothered itself to provide a general theory on
institutional guarantees.
As a result of these shortcomings, the concept of institutional guarantees has
come under criticism from some quarters25). Some authors have come to see the
concept as redundant and totally dispensable as an interpretive device. Critics argue
that it is obvious that most constitutional provisions need to be somehow
ʻinstitutionalizedʼ or ʻsystematizedʼ to make them effective, but even if we parted
with the idea of institutional guarantees altogether, the prevailing interpretation on
provisions such as Articles 20. 1, 20. 3, and 23, will substantially remain
unaltered26).
Notwithstanding the criticisms that the concept of institutional guarantees has
accrued among certain scholars, the idea of the existence of constitutionally
entrenched institutions seems attractive as an explanatory device on the role to be
performed by naturalization within the constitutional structure. In short, the concept
of institutional guarantee is useful to vest naturalization with a ʻconstitutional
pedigreeʼ. In particular, the notion of an institutionʼs essential core that cannot be
altered by the legislators seems to be especially suggestive.
In this sense, as Ashibe puts it, one condition for an institutional guarantee to
be regarded as such is that its essential core has to be clear. What then constitutes
the naturalizationʼs ʻessential coreʼ that cannot be altered by the legislature?
It could be argued that the essential core of any constitutionally protected
institution could be defined in functional terms, viz., trying to identify the function
25) K. Satô, Theory of the Japanese Constitution… op.cit. pp. 125-127.
26) M. Akasaka, “Human Rights and the Theory of Institutional Guarantees”「人権と制度的保
障理論」in M. Ooishi and K. Isikawa (eds.), Issues on Constitutional Law『憲法の争点』
Yuhikaku (2008) p. 71.
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or functions to be fulfilled by such an institution. Although this statement needs
qualification, I admittedly am proposing to take a somewhat ʻfunctionalist
approachʼ to naturalization, although by using a definition of ʻfunctionʼ, which is
radically different from the modern notion of the concept as developed by
Durkheim and others in the field of sociology. Unlike sociologists, who tend to
perceive society as an organic whole that transcends the sum of its parts because
they are interrelated through ʻfunctional relationshipsʼ, the method expounded in
this paper is avowedly finalist and teleological27). It assumes as a central tenet the
intuition that legal institutions do exist to serve a particular function­otherwise
they would be dysfunctional­and in doing so Thus, my approach welcomes a
ʻfunctionalism of means and endsʼ. This approach is all the more justifiable
considering how courts usually exercise adjudication28). Judges generally interpret
laws according to a function­sometimes manifest and sometimes able to be
inferred through a systematic study of the law­ intended by lawmakers, thereby
adopting an internal point of view. They are not sociologists seeking for some
latent function of the law as a social phenomenon.
How can we then define the function or functions to be fulfilled by
naturalization as a constitutionally protected institution? To be sure, individuals
may make use of a particular legal institution by pursuing different goals. Thus,
when a non-national decide to become a naturalized citizen, he or she may expect
this decision will serve different functions. For instance, he or she might want to
increase his or her work opportunities; he or she might be seeking for more social
stability; he or she might want to be entitled to bring family relatives to the
country; or he or she might just want to get rid of the risk of deportation once and
for all. Acceptable as these functions may be, they are nevertheless particular and
contingent and unfit to be considered as normative (and therefore universal)
functions for naturalization as a constitutionally protected institution.
27) The so called ʻfunctional methodʼ is commonly associated with the field of comparative law,
although as R. Michaels has pointed out, in reality, there are various –and even
contradictory– scholarly approaches that have been labeled as such. This author has identified
up to eight different concepts of functionalism across social disciplines, including one that is
apt for comparative law, which in reality is an amalgam of the rest. See R. Michaels, “The
Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law Oxford (2006) pp. 340-363.
28) As far as a judicial review is concerned, the previously described judgement of June 4, 2008
is a paradigmatic example of how the Supreme Court deploys a genuine end-and-means
analysis when assessing the constitutionality of a piece of legislation.
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In this regard I will single out two key functions in naturalization, as its
immutable core. Naturalization must serve 1) as a way of granting non-nationals
the full capacity to enjoy rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and 2)
as a mechanism for correcting democratic deficits.
First of all, naturalization operates as a mechanism by which individuals who
are subjected to the jurisdiction of a certain country, but who due to reasons of
birth are excluded from a complete protection of fundamental rights, may achieve
the full capacity to enjoy all constitutional protections under the same conditions as
nationals. I will enlarge on this idea in the following section by analyzing the
concept of ʻcapacityʼ in the field of fundamental rights.
Second of all, a democratic deficit is usually understood as any situation in
which there is a lack of democratic accountability and control over those who
govern by those who are governed. As individuals with restricted or no political
rights, non-nationals, especially permanent residents, find themselves in a situation
where the authorities empowered to pass the laws they are forced to abide by, are
not politically accountable to them. Naturalization in this sense allows non-
nationals to become fully fledged members of the body politic, thereby correcting
this democratic deficit. Hence, naturalization must be considered to be a built-in
constitutional institution with a salutary corrective effect on the democratic
system29). I believe this idea of naturalization as a mechanism to rectify democratic
deficits deserves special attention, not only as a constitutional topic, but also within
the broader context of immigrant integration policies. However, since an in-depth
discussion on the matter exceeds the scope of this work, I will postpone exploring
this idea and leave it to further research.
I will conclude the present section by asserting that if naturalization is
regulated in such a way that non-nationals cannot realistically expect to gain access
to the whole protection of constitutional rights, a systemic condition of formal
exclusion from the political process perpetuates. As a result, naturalization
becomes ʻdysfunctionalʼ, raising thereby constitutional issues.
3- Capacity in the field of fundamental rights
Fundamental rights can be understood as a set of freedoms and protections
that a legal system recognizes for all individuals under its jurisdiction, regardless of
29) This is particularly the case in Japan, which can be considered the only advanced industrial
democracy with a fourth-generation immigrant problem. See E. A. Chung, Immigration &
Citizenship in Japan Cambridge (2010) p. 3.
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any particular background or circumstances30). As legal entitlements, fundamental
rights are deemed inalienable; they are so inherently attached to individuals that
they cannot be taken away from anyone­they cannot be made ʻalienʼ­even if the
bearer of the right has agreed to this. Fundamental rights are thus sacred and
absolute, although in reality, the particular exercise of fundamental rights might be
restricted according to circumstances such as age and legal status. Thus, minors
have limited rights to access information so as to protect them from ideas that
could have a negative effect on their psychological development; public servants
might have their labor rights restricted to preserve the impartiality of the public
sector; inmates might be denied their right to vote out of reasons of public interest;
and foreigners may have limited access to welfare benefits simply because the state
cannot provide for everyone.
In this sense, the ideas of limiting the exercise of rights and of acting in the
legal arena through the intervention of a proxy are a staple of the sphere of private
law. The concepts of ʻlegal personhoodʼ, i.e., the capacity of bearing legal rights
and duties, and ʻlegal capacityʼ, i.e., the ability of individuals to independently
create, modify, or terminate legal relationships have had currency since the classic
era of Roman law. A question arises then as to whether we could make use of
these categories as analytical devices in the field fundamental rights guaranteed by
a constitution.
I have addressed the issue in an essay on the exercise of fundamental rights
during the age of minority31). There I devised three interrelated concepts to
describe how minors may act as subjects of fundamental rights: 1)
constitutional personhood, 2) constitutional entitlement, and 3) constitutional
capacity32).
30) In practical terms, this definition might also hold good for the concept of ʻhuman rightsʼ,
and, in fact, both terms ʻfundamental rightsʼ and ʻhuman rightsʼ are commonly used
indistinctively in Japan. The Constitution itself merges both concepts under the category of
ʻfundamental human rightsʼ. Be that as it may, since the concept of fundamental rights
assumes the existence of an operative domestic legal system, I have preferred to use the term
ʻfundamental rightsʼ.
31) See L. Pedriza, “The Concept of Capacity in Fundamental Right- the Meaning of Minority”
「基本権における『能力』の概念―未成年期の意義―」in M. Sogabe and K. Akasaka
(eds.), Ideals and Development of Constitutional Reform (Vol. 2)『憲法改革の理念と展開
（下巻）』Shinzansha (2012) pp. 599-611.
32) For an equivalent analytical framework, see B. Aláez Corral, Minoría de Edad y Derechos
Fundamentales Tecnos (2003) pp. 107-167.
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Constitutional personhood
Constitutional personhood can be described as the theoretical and compre-
hensive capacity recognized for every individual qua individual to be a bearer of
constitutionally protected rights33). This concept is somehow equivalent to that of
legal personhood, although there is an essential difference between them. Whereas
legal personhood presupposes the existence of an operative system of private law34),
constitutional personhood serves as the foundations upon which the whole system
of fundamental rights is built upon. Admittedly, the concept is rife with naturalist
overtones, although not more than the very idea of ʻhuman dignityʼ, as popularized
by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights to serve as a pivotal concept for
human rights discourse. In this sense, constitutional personhood is inalienable,
imprescriptible, and indivisible. Furthermore, constitutional personhood is assumed
to ʻpredateʼ the Constitution, so it has to be recognized for anyone regardless of
any legal status. In short, constitutional personhood operates mostly as a theoretical
concept brought about out of the necessity to find appropriate anchorage points to
secure the whole system of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the concept is not
simply based upon an idealized view of human nature or human reason, but the
actual capacity that individuals have to take part in social interactions. In other
words, without fundamental rights individuals cannot interact with each other in
their social life.
Constitutional entitlement
Constitutional entitlement –or rather ʻentitlementsʼ– refers to the actual
condition of being the bearer or a particular fundamental right guaranteed by the
constitution. In any particular constitutional system then, there may exist as many
constitutional entitlements as fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. In
this sense, whereas constitutional personhood is recognized for any individual qua
individual, different constitutional entitlements are granted to individuals depending
on their respective legal status. To be sure, most fundamental rights (e.g., freedom
of expression, freedom of religion, and so on) are recognized as a matter of course,
regardless of status. However, among the catalog of rights enshrined in a
constitution, there are some that are not granted to everyone. Indeed, under most
constitutional systems foreigners are not ʻentitledʼ to vote in national elections, and
legal persons are vested with fundamental rights “to the extent that the nature of
33) In a similar vein, see B. Aláez Corral, Minoría de Edad… op.cit. p. 107.
34) Cf. the Japanese Civil Code Article 3.1 determining “The enjoyment of private rights (私権)
shall commence at birth”. The Code itself ʻcreatesʼ legal personhood.
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such rights permits”35).
As far as natural persons are concerned, nationality is the legal status that
determines the scope of constitutional entitlements36). In other words, being a
national is therefore the key criterion to determine who will be entitled to the
whole array of entitlements protected by the constitution and who will not. Even
today, when more and more states have come to almost equalize non-nationals with
nationals, insofar as the protection of fundamental rights is concerned, there is still
a category of constitutional entitlements, viz., so-called political rights, whose
guarantee remains ­admittedly, to a decreasing extent­ a matter of legal status, i.
e., a matter of nationality.
Constitutional capacity
Constitutional capacity is the ability of an individual to exercise a particular
fundamental right (i.e., a constitutional entitlement) by him/herself, without the
intervention of a proxy. It goes without saying, that this concept resembles that of
legal capacity in the sphere of private law. That being said, it is important to
understand that not having a full constitutional capacity regarding certain
fundamental rights does not imply there is a lack of constitutional entitlement.
Thus, minors,­ provided of course, they are nationals­ are ʻentitledʼ to voting
rights, although their exercise is limited until they reach the age of majority.
Unlike nationality, insofar as the exercise of fundamental rights is concerned,
minority, viz., a state of affairs where an individual is deemed to be in need of
special protection, cannot be considered as a legal status. Let us illustrate the point
with a simple example: as a general rule, citizens in the USA can register to vote
before they turn 18 if they will reach 18 by Election Day37). Considering that
registering to vote is in itself part of the electoral process, it can be said that, the
fact minors can register to vote before they turn 18 is due to their entitlement to
voting rights even during minority.
Among the concepts analyzed above, ʻconstitutional personhoodʼ and
ʻconstitutional entitlementʼ can be particularly helpful when trying to understand
how naturalization accomplishes its functions. Thus, naturalization serves as a path
for non-nationals to achieve full protection of constitutional entitlements.
To use a simile, we can think of constitutional personhood as a piece of land
35) Cf. Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 19.3.
36) Cf. the Japanese Supreme Courtʼs words in the previously described ruling of June 4, 2008,
which regarded nationality as inter alia “an important legal status (…) to enjoy the guarantee
of fundamental human rights, obtain public positions or receive public benefits”.
37) https://www.usa.gov/voter-registration-age-requirements
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allotted to each individual, which allows its owner to build up a complex structure
made up of different constitutional entitlements, as though they were bricks. The
extension and condition of each lot of land is exactly the same, although the shape
and robustness­or rather ʻcompletenessʼ­of the structure built upon it depends on
each individual being a national or a non-national. For non-nationals, the structure
remains unfinished. Nevertheless, since all lots of land are of the same quality,
finishing the constitutional structure by adding the missing bricks is always
possible. In this sense, naturalization works by aiming at bringing the edifice of
constitutional entitlements to full completion. The simile is admittedly simplistic; it
nonetheless suffices to illustrate the necessity for acknowledging naturalization as a
constitutionally protected institution.
4- Article 22.2 and the right to abandon oneʼs nationality
In Ashibeʼs understanding of the concept, the raison d’être of any institutional
guarantee ought to be the promotion of a certain constitutional right­
notwithstanding the ʻinconvenienceʼ of some institutional guarantees located
ʻoutside the bill of rightsʼ. Then, if naturalization is to be considered as an
institutional guarantee, what is the fundamental right to be promoted by it?
Obviously, as a legal procedure that gives access to a full set of constitutional
entitlements, naturalization has a significant impact on the protection of the
constitutional rights of non-nationals. However, even if naturalization enhances the
guarantee of all constitutional rights ʻat onceʼ, it would nonetheless seem that
naturalization, in and of itself, is not linked to the protection of any fundamental
right in particular. It is my contention though that, as far as the Japanese
constitution is concerned, at least one particular right granted in the bill of rights
can be pinned down as being directly promoted by the existence of naturalization.
Indeed, a systematic study of the constitutional text, including its foundational
principles, could lead us to conclude that naturalization can be understood as the
institutional guarantee aimed at the protection of the right of abandon oneʼs
nationality as established by Article 22.2, although not in the conventional, ­and
thus far, uncontroversial­way in which this provision has been interpreted.
Because if there is one provision in the bill of rights that has brought about the
least controversy among constitutional scholars, it is undoubtedly Article 22.2 that
states:
“Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves
of their nationality shall be inviolate.”
To the overwhelming majority of constitutional law academics the right
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guaranteed by this provision is essentially a right extended to all Japanese nationals
to acquire a different citizenship, yet such freedom does not include a right to
become a stateless person38).
Even scholars who advocate extending the protection of fundamental rights to
non-national permanent residents to such an extent almost equivalent to that
guaranteed for Japanese nationals, agree with the majoritarian doctrine on the
content of Article 22.2 and believe that the right of abandon oneʼs nationality only
matters to Japanese people39).
Indeed, the chief criticism leveled at the so-called wording-approach is
precisely this common opinion that even though the Constitutionʼs language
guarantees the right to abandonʼs one nationality to ʻall personsʼ, it is the ʻnatureʼ
of the right to be limited only to Japanese nationals.
In this regard, A. Kondô has launched a formidable critique on this ʻarticle of
faithʼ. By not paying attention to constitutional language, Kondô argues we risk
betraying the constitutionalist ideals of guaranteeing rights to individuals by
enshrining them in a bill of rights40). What is more, according to this author, the
dominant nature-approach may lead us to accept unreasonable legislative decisions
such as that adopted by Article 6 of the State Redress Law, which limits the right
to obtain compensation from the stateʼs wrongdoing to non-nationals on the basis
of reciprocity, even though the Constitution in Article 17 grants such a right to
ʻevery personʼ. Kondô states that it is unfair that an individual who has been
unlawfully aggrieved by a public official should let the matter drop simply because
the legal system of his or her country of origin does not grant such a right to
Japanese nationals41).
At this point, let us go back to Article 22.2 and try to test the common
38) As representative authors, see N. Ashibe, Constitutional law… op.cit. p. 367, K. Takahashi,
Constitutionalism and the Constitution of Japan (3rd ed.),『立憲主義と日本国憲法（第⚓
版）』Yuhikaku (2013) p. 245, K. Satô, Theory of the Japanese Constitution… op.cit. pp. 109
and 297-298, and M. Ooishi, Lectures on Constitutional Law II (2nd ed.)『憲法講義 II（第
⚒版）』 Yuhikaku (2012) p. 122.
39) See N. Urabe, Classroom of Constitutional Law (3rd ed.)『憲法学教室（第⚓版）』
Nihonhyoronsha (2016) p. 254.
40) See A. Kondô, Human Rights and Citizenship of Foreigners『外国人の人権と市民権』
Akashi-shoten (2001) pp. 274-278.
41) A. Kondô, “Rights of Foreigners- Focusing on the Political Participation of Permanent
Residents”「外国人の権利―永住外国人の地方参政権を中心に―」in Meijo-hôgaku Vol.
60 Bessatsu (2010) p. 9 retrieved at: http://law.meijo-u.ac.jp/staff/contents/60-sp/60bessatsu
28_kondo.pdf
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assumption that the right to abandon oneʼs nationality is not guaranteed to
foreigners by posing a simple question: To what extent can the Constitution
effectively guarantee such a right to a Japanese national?
First, apart from the principle that the law should not allow a citizen to
become a stateless person, ­which operates as a prohibition and not as a right­the
Constitution cannot actually guarantee that a Japanese national can acquire a new
citizenship, since this is a decision for a different country to take. Nor conversely,
could the Japanese government impede a Japanese national from becoming a
citizen of a different country. In fact, a sovereign nation can grant its nationality to
a Japanese national regardless of whether the Japanese government might agree
with the decision or not. This would not change a single bit, even if the right to
abandon oneʼs nationality had not been guaranteed by the Constitution.
Second, assume for instance that Japan restricted naturalization to citizens of a
certain country. In this case, the National Diet might have restricted the
possibilities for Japanese nationals to acquire that countryʼs nationality if it were
granted on the basis of reciprocity.
However, when we analyze Article 22.2 from the perspective of a non-
national, things begin to make much more sense. As most scholars agree, Article
22.2 is based upon the principle that individuals should have freedom to choose
their nationality42). Indeed, this principle is already well entrenched in international
law43). However, since the Japanese legal system cannot ensure that Japanese
nationals may acquire the citizenship of a foreign country, the only entitlement that
Article 22.2 of the Constitution, ­being it the right to choose oneʼs nationality­can
effectively guarantee is one that grants foreigners the right to obtain Japanese
citizenship.
Obviously, I do not mean that any foreigner in Japan (even illegal immigrants)
have a constitutional right to obtain naturalization whenever they feel like it. What
I do mean is that the Constitution, as a document committed to the principle of
freedom of choosing nationality, commands the legislature to establish a
mechanism to grant Japanese citizenship to foreigners when certain conditions are
met; and this mechanism is none other than naturalization. In this sense, it can be
asserted that, along with the right to abandon oneʼs nationality, ­a right which, as
42) In this vein, see H. Yasebe, Constitutional Law (6th ed.)『憲法（第⚖版）』Shinseisha
(2014) p. 253.
43) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 15.2 guarantees “No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”
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we have seen could even be considered somewhat useless from the perspective of a
Japanese national­Article 22. 2 grants the right to have access to Japanese
citizenship.
This construction of Article 22.2 conforms with the idea of naturalization as a
constitutionally protected institution. To be sure, since the Constitution in Article
10 determines that the conditions to acquire Japanese nationality should be
determined by law, it must be concluded that the National Diet has broad leeway to
regulate the right of foreigners to have access to citizenship. Nevertheless, as the
Supreme Court has determined, the discretionary powers vested upon the
legislature by Article 10 are not boundless and must respect some constitutional
principles. What then are those principles? Although this question requires further
research, I consider that three principles should be complied with in order to
respect the core content of naturalization as a mechanism for non-nationals to
achieve full protection of constitutional entitlements.
I. The law should establish a process of naturalization open to all non-
nationals under the conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
II. The law cannot deny naturalization to a particular non-national on the
basis that his or her country of origin does not allow citizens to give up
their nationality44).
III. The law cannot deny naturalization, or require harsher requisites from the
citizens of a particular country on the basis that such a country does not
extend naturalization to Japanese citizens or imposes stricter conditions to
them.
5- Conclusion
Throughout this work, I have explored the idoneity of considering
naturalization as a constitutionally protected institution. In doing so, I have also
singled out granting non-nationals full access to the full array of constitutional
entitlements and correcting democratic deficits as the two chief constitutional
functions to be achieved by naturalization. Thus, I have stressed the constitutional
pedigree of this institution and its extraordinary strength in terms of enhacing
rights protection and democratic accountability.
The open language, on the other hand, of Article 10 of the Constitution
regarding the conditions to become a Japanese national has permeated the minds of
most Japanese scholars of constitutional law to such an extent, that there exists an
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44) This principle seems to agree with Article 5.2 of the Nationality Law (see the Appendix).
ingrained opinion that even if, theoretically, the legislatorsʼ discretionary powers
on regulating naturalization are not absolutely boundless, they are so in practical
terms45). However, as a constitutionally protected institution, naturalization is not to
be understood simply as one of many different ways of obtaining citizenship, but
as a necessary mechanism that stems from the ubiquitous distinction between
nationals and non-nationals, viz., between full members of society and those who
are merely tolerated ones.
In conclusion, we can assert that the Constitution in Article 22.2 grants a right
to naturalization­not a right of naturalization­which consists of protecting the
legitimate expectations of non-nationals to gain access to citizenship whenever all
the requirements set out by the law are met. Therefore, we can also argue that, in
this sense, the discretionary powers of the administrative authorities in deciding
who is to become a new national should be circumscribed to ascertain whether
these legal requirements have been objectively met by the applicant46). It is in this
sense when the relationship between the two constitutional provisions, i.e., Articles
10 and 22.2, becomes clear: the former provision directs legislators with the task of
establishing the conditions to become a Japanese national and the latter guarantees
everyone who has been excluded from Japanese nationality to have access to
citizenship whenever the existence of ʻclose tiesʼ with Japan can be ascertained.
APPENDIX
Japanese Nationality Law
Naturalization47)
Article 4
A person who is not a Japanese national (hereinafter [called] “an alien”) may
acquire Japanese nationality by naturalization.
2. The permission of the Minister of Justice shall be obtained for naturalization.
45) In this regard, note that in the Supreme Courtʼs ruling of June 4, 2008 many dissenting
opinions were added, basically stating that it was beyond the powers of judicial review to
change the conditions to acquire Japanese nationality as set out by legislators.
46) This idea seems to run counter to the official opinion expressed by the Japanese authorities
determining that even if the conditions required by law are met, the Minister of Justice has
full discretionary powers to deny naturalization. Cf. statement made by I. Nakamura on April
3, 1984 before the Committee on Judicial Affairs of the House of Representatives. See
“Proceedings of the Committee on Judicial Affairs of the House of Representatives of the
101st National Diet” n. 5 (1989) p. 17.
47) Adapted from an English translation provided by the Ministry of Justice at http://www.moj.
go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html
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Article 5
The Minister of Justice shall not permit the naturalization of an alien unless
he/she fulfills all of the following conditions:
(1) That he/she has domiciled in Japan for five years or more consecutively;
(2) That he/she is twenty years of age or more and of full capacity to act
according to the law of his/her home country;
(3) That he/she is of upright conduct;
(4) That he/she is able to secure a livelihood by oneʼs own property or
ability, or those of oneʼs spouse or other relatives with whom one lives
on common living expenses;
(5) That he/she has no nationality, or the acquisition of Japanese nationality
will result in the loss of foreign nationality;
(6) That he/she has never plotted or advocated, or formed or belonged to a
political party or other organization which has plotted or advocated the
overthrow of the Constitution of Japan or the Government existing
thereunder, since the enforcement of the Constitution of Japan.
2. When an alien is, regardless of his/ her intention, unable to deprive himself or
herself of his or her current nationality, the Minister of Justice may permit the
naturalization of the alien, notwithstanding that the alien does not fulfill the
conditions set forth in item (5) of the preceding paragraph, if the Minister of
Justice finds exceptional circumstances in his/her family relationship with a
Japanese national, or other circumstances.
Article 6
The Minister of Justice may permit the naturalization of an alien
notwithstanding that the alien does not fulfill the condition set forth in item (1) of
paragraph 1 of the last preceding Article, provided that the said alien falls under
any one of the following items, and is presently domiciled in Japan:
(1) One who has had a domicile or residence in Japan for three consecutive
years or more and who is the child of a person who was a Japanese
national (excluding a child by adoption);
(2) One who was born in Japan and who has had a domicile or residence in
Japan for three consecutive years or more, or whose father or mother
(excluding father and mother by adoption) was born in Japan;
(3) One who has had a residence in Japan for ten consecutive years or more.
Article 7
The Minister of Justice may permit the naturalization of an alien who is the
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spouse of a Japanese national notwithstanding that the said alien does not fulfill the
conditions set forth in items (1) and (2) of paragraph 1 of Article 5, if the said
alien has had a domicile or residence in Japan for three consecutive years or more
and is presently domiciled in Japan. The same rule shall apply in the case where an
alien who is the spouse of a Japanese national has been married with the Japanese
national for three years or more and has had a domicile in Japan for one
consecutive year or more.
Article 8
The Minister of Justice may permit the naturalization of an alien
notwithstanding that the alien does not fulfill the conditions set forth in items (1),
(2) and (4) of paragraph 1 of Article 5, provided that the alien falls under any one
of the following items:
(1) One who is a child (excluding a child by adoption) of a Japanese
national and has a domicile in Japan;
(2) One who is a child by adoption of a Japanese national and has had a
domicile in Japan for one consecutive year or more and was a minor
according to the law of its [sic] native country at the time of the
adoption;
(3) One who has lost Japanese nationality (excluding one who has lost
Japanese nationality after naturalization in Japan) and has a domicile in
Japan;
(4) One who was born in Japan and has had no nationality since the time of
birth, and has had a domicile in Japan for three consecutive years or
more since then.
Article 9
With respect to an alien who has rendered especially meritorious service to
Japan, the Minister of Justice may, notwithstanding the provision of Article 5,
paragraph 1, permit the naturalization of the alien with the approval of the Diet.
Article 10
The Minister of Justice shall, when permitting naturalization, make an
announcement to that effect by public notice in the Official Gazette.
2. The naturalization shall come into effect as from the date of the public notice
under the preceding paragraph.
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